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Risk Disclosure, Income Smoothing and Firm Risk 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: Evidence on whether firms with higher risk choose a more transparent or more opaque 
risk reporting strategy in their annual reports is mixed. A potential explanation is that firms choose 
an alternative reporting strategy to risk disclosure, namely income smoothing. The purpose of this 
paper is to investigate the association between both strategies in relation to firm risk levels. 
Design/Methodology: We use a balanced sample of 74 non-financial UK firms from the FTSE100 
index over the period 2005-2015, examining the association between firm risk measures and both 
risk disclosure and income smoothing using a seemingly unrelated regression methodology. 
Findings: We find that firm financial risk measures are positively associated with both risk 
disclosure and income smoothing, implying a complementary association. Furthermore, non-risk 
related factors are associated with both lower levels of risk disclosure and higher income 
smoothing, implying a substitutive effect.  
Research limitations: We do not consider other factors such as managerial optimism, managerial 
financial incentives and analysts’ earnings forecasts which might influence the association 
between risk disclosure and income smoothing and hence this may be a limitation of the current 
study. 
Practical implications: These results are important to regulators, investors and boards of directors 
who are interested in understanding the alternative reporting strategies that managers select when 
faced with high risk. The findings signal a need for closer regulatory scrutiny on not only the level 
of risk disclosure but the financial reporting choices.  
Originality/Value: We extend the literature on the reporting vs. recognition decisions made by 
managers. 
Keywords: Risk disclosure; Income smoothing; Firm risk; Textual analysis 
JEL Codes : M10 ; M41 ; G32 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence on whether firms with higher risk choose a more transparent or more opaque risk 
reporting strategy in their annual reports is mixed (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Marshall and 
Weetman, 2007; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy et al., 2013). A potential explanation 
is that firms choose an alternative reporting strategy to risk disclosure, namely income smoothing, 
given that firms with smoother income are perceived as being less risky (Graham et al., 2005).  
Prior literature documents that firms often use disclosure and recognition practices (earnings 
reporting) as substitutes. For example, firms with higher overall disclosure quality (Lobo and 
Zhou, 2001; Mouselli et al., 2012; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017), greater disclosure frequency 
(Jo and Kim, 2007) and increased disclosure transparency (Cassell et al., 2015) report lower levels 
of discretionary accruals in their financial statements. Similarly, firms that voluntarily disclose 
more information in their annual reports exhibit less use of discretionary accruals to smooth 
earnings (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006). However, some evidence points to disclosure and 
recognition practices being used as complements. For example, firms with higher levels of 
voluntary disclosure exhibit a smoother earnings stream (Cox, 1985; Francis et al., 2008). 
Similarly, firms with higher disclosure quality use discretionary accruals to smooth earnings more 
aggressively than firms with lower disclosure quality (Shaw, 2003). 
In the context of risk reporting, firms with higher risk may choose to increase (not increase) the 
level of risk reporting as well as report (not report) a smoother stream of income. Therefore, these 
alternative reporting strategies can be associated in a complementary or substitutive way. We 
empirically examine whether the level of risk disclosure and income smoothing are 
complementary/substitutive reporting mechanisms with respect to firm risk levels, using a 
seemingly unrelated regression methodology. We focus on several measures of risk including: 
beta, leverage, solvency, liquidity, and operational risks.  
Using a sample of FTSE 100 firms with available data over the period 2005-2015, we find that 
firms’ financial risk is positively associated with both risk disclosure and income smoothing. 
Specifically, firms with higher leverage risk report both smoother income and more risk 
information, implying a complementary relationship. We also find that non-risk related factors are 
associated with both lower levels of risk disclosure and higher income smoothing, implying a 
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substitutive association. The results are robust to an alternative measure of income smoothing, a 
further test on the substitutive relation, and in a subsample analysis of high-risk and low-risk firms. 
This study contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
examining the association between risk disclosure and firm risk (e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2005; 
Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Khlif and Hussainey, 2016). Whereas this 
literature examines risk reporting, the current study focuses on a different reporting strategy - 
income smoothing - that firms use alongside risk reporting. Our evidence showing that risk is 
positively associated with income smoothing is an extension to prior literature. Second, we 
contribute to the literature examining the association between disclosure and reporting strategies 
(e.g. Kasznik, 1999; Lobo and Zhou, 2001; Shaw, 2003; Lapointe-Antunes et al., 2006; Jans et al., 
2008; Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014; Cassell et al., 2015; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017). 
In particular, our study extends this literature by focusing on an alternative type of disclosure, 
through risk reporting and documenting that risk disclosure is associated with earnings 
management. Finally, we contribute to the income smoothing literature by presenting the 
underlying riskiness of firms as a driver of smoothing behavior (e.g. Grant et al., 2009). In this 
context, we present further evidence on risk measures such as leverage, solvency and operational 
risks that are positively associated with income smoothing. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample selection and methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion. Section 5 presents additional analyses and 
robustness checks and the last section concludes.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
A firm’s risk reporting strategy involves textual risk disclosure of information to the public about 
the firm’s exposure to potential losses and threats which could impact future profitability 
(Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). In the UK, risk reporting 
requirements relate to internal control risks (FRC, 2014), financial risk (International Financial 
Reporting Standards), and business risk (Companies Act, 2006).  However, firms in the UK face 
no regulation of a specific quantity, template or format for risk disclosure. Therefore, discretion is 
to some extent inherent in the quantity and quality dimensions of risk disclosure (Dobler, 2008). 
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It follows, therefore, that managers may use their discretion to decide on whether to withhold or 
expand the level of risk information to be communicated to external parties. 
Under agency theory, managers provide more disclosure of risk information voluntarily in order 
to reduce information asymmetry about firms’ risk levels, and hence lower agency costs (e.g. 
Abdullah et al., 2015). Similarly, under signaling theory, managers reduce information asymmetry 
by signaling firm risk information and risk management policies voluntarily to outsiders in order 
to distinguish their firms from other firms which disclose less risk information and lack such 
policies (Elshandidy et al., 2013).  
Prior empirical work on textual risk disclosure finds mixed evidence on the association between 
risk disclosure and firms’ risk levels (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Marshall and 
Weetman, 2007; Dobler et al., 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015; 
Khlif and Hussainey, 2016). For example, Elshandidy et al. (2013) find that firms provide more 
risk disclosures as their systematic, financing risk and risk-adjusted returns increase. Khlif and 
Hussainey (2016) find that firms with higher leverage ratios issue more risk information in order 
to mitigate creditors’ concerns related to the firm’s solvency. However, Linsley and Shrives (2005) 
find that FTSE 100 firms’ risk disclosures do not reflect the risks these firms face. This could be 
because risk disclosures increase firm perceived risk and augment job security concerns (Kravet 
and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2014). Based on this discussion, we formulate the first 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1: There is an association between the level of risk disclosure and firm risk.  
A separate strand of research focuses on the incentives of reporting a smooth stream of income in 
relation to firm risk levels. Agency theory suggests that the internal and external demand for 
income smoothing could be the equilibrium consequence of optimal contracting (Dye, 1988). The 
internal demand for income smoothing is driven by the managers’ interest to make firms look less 
risky for job security concerns; whereas the external demand comes from shareholders who prefer 
to invest in a firm with less earnings volatility. Similarly, signaling theory suggests that firms with 
asymmetric information can signal private information about managers’ assessments of their 
firm’s underlying risk and future prospects by smoothing earnings (Chaney and Lewis, 1995). 
Firms which smooth income are not only able to signal their higher abilities in managing risk, but 
also lower the level of firm perceived risk compared to other firms in the same industry (Graham 
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et al., 2005; Erickson et al., 2017). Prior empirical evidence shows significant associations 
between smoothing behavior and firm risk (e.g. Beattie et al., 1994; Tseng and Lai, 2007). Our 
second hypothesis is therefore formulated as follows:  
H2: There is an association between the extent of income smoothing and firm risk. 
The first two hypotheses examine risk disclosure and income smoothing as stand-alone strategies. 
However, decisions about both reporting strategies when firms are faced with high risk are 
expected to be made jointly (Tucker, 2015). Prior evidence investigating overall firm disclosure 
quality and level alongside recognition practices (through financial statements) implies that both 
risk disclosure and income smoothing are related.  
Some studies find evidence that firms with higher quality or level of disclosure have lower levels 
of earnings management, implying a substitutive relationship. For example, prior research reports 
a negative association between accruals-based earnings management and disclosure quality (Lobo 
and Zhou, 2001; Mouselli et al., 2012; Cassell et al., 2015; Katmon and Al Farooque, 2017). Cassell 
et al. (2015) find that higher accruals quality (i.e. lower accruals-based earnings management) is 
associated with more transparent disclosures of valuation allowance and reserve accounts. 
Mouselli et al. (2012) also find a positive association between accruals quality and disclosure 
quality. Lapointe-Antunes et al. (2006) find that firms disclosing information voluntarily in the 
annual report have lower use of discretionary accruals to smooth earnings. Chih et al. (2008) also 
find that firms providing more information on their corporate social responsibility practices are 
less likely to smooth reported earnings. 
However, other studies find that firms with higher voluntary disclosure have lower earnings 
volatility, implying a complementary association between voluntary disclosure and income 
smoothing (Cox, 1985; Francis et al., 2008). Shaw (2003) finds that firms with higher disclosure 
quality, measured through financial analysts’ ratings, smooth reported income through 
discretionary accruals more aggressively than firms with lower disclosure quality. 
In the context of risk reporting, we expect that firms with higher risk may choose to increase (not 
increase) the level of risk reporting or report (not report) a smoother stream of income. Therefore, 
these alternative reporting strategies can be associated in a complementary or substitutive way. 
Under agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that not all members of the boards of directors 
work to improve management’s accountability and financial reporting. Furthermore, managers 
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may have weaker incentives to reveal information about their firms’ risk profile fearing that their 
fiduciary duty will be subject to more detailed scrutiny and investor litigation (e.g. Leftwich et al., 
1981). Therefore, it is possible that managers use their financial reporting choices to mask the 
firm’s underlying volatility and make the firm appear less risky. Under this scenario, we expect 
that, as firm risk increases, managers will disclose less risk information and report smoother 
earnings.  
However, arguments based on signaling theory suggest that managers use their reporting choices 
in a way that signals the firm’s real underlying risk as well as their honest expectations of the 
firm’s future prospects in order to lower firm perceived risk. In this setting, we expect that 
managers will report more risk disclosures and smoother earnings as firm risk increases. Given 
these two alternative predictions, the hypothesis on the relation between risk disclosure and 
earnings smoothing with respect to firm risk is formulated as follows: 
H3: There is a complementary (substitutive) association between the level of risk disclosure and 
the extent of income smoothing in relation to firm risk. 
3. Sample selection and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of firms with at least three consecutive years of listing on the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE100) index in the UK over the period 2005-2015 (similar to studies 
such as in Linsley and Shrives, 2005 and Abraham and Shrives, 2014). We exclude financial 
companies as they are subject to a different regulatory framework for disclosure practices. This 
yields an initial sample of 96 firms. We exclude 22 firms with missing accounting and market data, 
yielding a final balanced sample of 74 firms with 814 firm-year observations. 
Financial data is collected from Bloomberg and Datastream for the financial years 2005-2013. In 
addition, we obtain annual reports from Thomson ONE, when available, or the firms’ websites. In 
line with prior research, the continuous variables in this study are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values in order to reduce the impact of outliers (Kravet and Muslu, 2013).1 
                                                            
1 Our inferences remain unchanged when we only winsorize the continuous explanatory variables. 
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3.2 Variables measurement 
3.2.1 Measurement of risk disclosure (RD) 
Our risk disclosure variable (RD) is measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
sentences containing at least one risk-related keyword. We use an automated content analysis using 
Nudist 6 to search and count the total number of risk-related sentences, containing at least one risk 
keyword, in each annual report.2 Consistent with prior research, we adopt the sentence unit-of-
analysis approach to identify risk-related sentences in order to avoid multiple counting of the same 
risk-related information with more than one keyword (Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Elgammal et al., 
2018). Appendix 1 presents our final keyword list, consisting of 27 risk-related word roots. The 
list includes some keywords that are similar to those used in prior studies (e.g., Li, 2006; Kravet 
and Muslu, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013, 2015). Our risk disclosure measure strongly correlates 
with Li’s (2006) and Kravet and Muslu’s (2013) with a correlation coefficient of 0.87 and 0.73, 
respectively.  
3.2.2 Measurement of income smoothing (IS) 
We measure the extent of income smoothing (IS)  by calculating the ratio of a firm’s standard 
deviation of operating income divided by the standard deviation of its cash flow from operations 
(both deflated by the beginning-of-year total assets) using annual data over the current and past 
four years’ observations (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). We multiply the measure by minus one so that 
higher values correspond to higher levels of income smoothing.  
We alternatively use IS_Corr, measured as the correlation between changes in accounting accruals 
and changes in cash flows from operations (both deflated by total assets), over a five-year period 
(e.g., Leuz et al., 2003). We calculate accruals from the cash flow statement in line with Hribar 
and Collins (2002). We also multiply this measure by minus one so that higher values correspond 
to higher levels of income smoothing. 
3.2.3 Measurement of firm risk levels 
Our independent variables include firm market-risk and accounting-risk measures: Beta, Leverage, 
Solvency, Liquidity, and Op_Risk. We first use beta (Beta) as a market-risk measure to assess 
                                                            
2 Nudist 6 is a text analysis package used in several studies on corporate textual disclosure (e.g., Hussainey et al., 
2003). 
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firms’ systematic risk (e.g. Beattie et al., 1994; Linsley and Shrives, 2006). Beta is estimated using 
market model regressions of firms’ monthly stock returns on the value weighted market index, 
over a five-year period. 
We use leverage and asset coverage ratios to measure financial risk (e.g., Carlson and Bathala, 
1997; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Tseng and Lai, 2007; Elshandidy 
et al., 2013). The leverage ratio (Leverage) is calculated by dividing total debt by total equity. The 
asset coverage ratio (Solvency) is calculated by dividing the difference between net assets and net 
liabilities by total liabilities. We use the reciprocal of the leverage and coverage ratios, so that 
higher values indicate higher financial risks.  
We also include liquidity risk, Liquidity, (e.g., Shen and Chih, 2005; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013) calculated as the reciprocal of the current ratio. Finally, we use operational 
risk (Op_Risk) which is a firm-specific risk arising from changes in the firm’s operating cash flows 
(Markarian and Gill-de-Albornoz, 2012). Op_Risk is the standard deviation of operating cash flows 
deflated by total assets, estimated using annual data over a five-year period. 
3.3 Empirical model  
To account for simultaneity between risk disclosure and income smoothing, we use a simultaneous 
equation system by employing seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR), similar to Abernethy et al. 
(2015). We first estimate SUR regressions for each financial reporting choice to determine whether 
both reporting choices are related to firm risk measures. Risk disclosure and income smoothing 
are considered complements (substitutes) when the coefficients of similar risk measures are 
significantly related to both reporting choices with similar (different) signs.  
Then, we run correlational tests of the residuals of the regressions. Risk disclosure and income 
smoothing are considered complements (substitutes) when the correlation between the error terms 
is significant and positive (negative). The error terms represent the unexplained portions of the 
variation in risk disclosure and income smoothing resulting from omitted variables related to both 
reporting choices. The SUR is estimated using the following equations on a pooled time-series, 
cross-sectional basis:   
 9 
 
RDit = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + 
β6RARit + β7Sizeit + β8Growthit + β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + 
β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit                                                     (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                               
ISit = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + 
β6RARit + β7Sizeit + β8Growthit + β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + 
β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit                                                     (2)                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
where i refers to the firm and t to the year. β0 is the intercept and β1-13 are the slope coefficients of 
firm risk measures and control variables. RD and IS represent the risk disclosure and income 
smoothing variables, respectively, which were discussed in the previous section. The risk measures 
as discussed in the previous section include: Beta, Leverage, Solvency, Liquidity, and Op_Risk. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
We include several control variables that have been shown in the literature to be associated with 
risk disclosure and income smoothing including risk-adjusted returns (RAR), firm size (Size),   firm 
growth (Growth), firm profitability (Profitability), dividend payout (Dividend) and US-cross 
listing (Cross_Listing) (Michelson et al., 1995; Lang et al., 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007; Miihkinen, 2012; Campbell et al., 2014; Liu and Espahbodi, 2014; 
Elshandidy et al., 2018). We also include the proportion of independent directors on the board 
(Ind_Directors) and analyst following (Analysts) representing internal and external monitoring 
(Gul and Leung, 2004; Kao and Chen, 2004; Huang et al., 2009; Ntim et al., 2013; Chen et al., 
2017; Yu et al., 2018). Finally, we include industry and year fixed effects using dummy variables 
to control for changing microeconomic factors across time and industries. We estimate robust 
standard errors clustered at firm level to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
problems. All control variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the study variables. The table shows that the 
mean natural logarithm of the risk disclosure measure, RD, is 5.5 which is approximately 
equivalent to 282 risk-related statements disclosed in UK firms’ annual reports. With respect to 
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IS, the average value is -1.27 indicating that firms on average exhibit higher volatility in operating 
income as compared to operating cash flows.  
Our sample has a mean value of systematic risk (Beta) of 1.02, suggesting that firms in our sample 
are more risky than average. The mean leverage risk is 0.97 and that of solvency risk is 0.73. The 
mean liquidity risk is 0.97, equivalent to a current ratio that is slightly above one (1.03). 
Operational risk has a mean value of 0.03. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents pairwise Pearson and Spearman correlations for the study variables. 
The coefficients for all pairs of the independent variables are below 0.8, thus indicating no 
multicollinearity problems. Similarly, Variance Inflation Indicators (untabulated) are below 10 for 
all independent variables, thus confirming that our model is not affected by multicollinearity (Hair 
et al., 2006). The table indicates a significant negative correlation between risk disclosure and 
income smoothing (Spearman correlation coefficient = -0.16), thus suggesting a trade-off between 
both reporting choices. Also, leverage risk is significantly positively correlated with risk disclosure 
and income smoothing. We also find that risk disclosure is negatively related to liquidity risk, but 
positively related to systematic risk (Beta). In addition, we find a positive association between IS 
and operational risk.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
4.2 Empirical results  
We present our main tests in Table 2. The results in column 1 show that financial risk measures 
Leverage and Solvency are significantly and positively related to risk disclosure (β2 = 0.063 and 
β3 = 0.026, both significant at the 1% level) similar to findings in prior research (e.g., Marshall 
and Weetman, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Khlif and Hussainey, 2016). We also find that 
liquidity risk (Liquidity) is negatively associated with risk disclosure (β4 = -0.139, significant at 
the 1% level). These confirm our first hypothesis (H1). 
In column 2, we find a significant positive association between financial risk and income 
smoothing, which provides support to our second hypothesis (H2). Specifically, we find that 
Leverage and Solvency are significantly and positively related to income smoothing (β2 = 0.076 
and β3 = 0.068, significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively). This is in line with prior studies 
which find that smoothing reduces the debt cost of capital hence mitigating the probability of 
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breaching debt covenants and costly renegotiations (Gassen and Fülbier, 2015; Amiram and 
Owens, 2018). We also find a positive association between operational risk (Op_Risk) and income 
smoothing (β5 = 9.096, significant at the 1% level), confirming H2. In terms of the control 
variables, significant variables include RAR, Size, Profitability, and Analysts. 
The findings in both columns 1 and 2 indicate that as financial risk increases, firms report higher 
levels of smoothed income and risk information in a complementary way. This could be in order 
to dampen the disclosure tone of firms’ financial risk with smooth income so that firms do not 
appear as risky as the risk disclosures might imply. Hence, we conclude that highly leveraged firms 
are more likely to complement risk disclosures with smoothed income in order to reduce financial 
statement users’ risk perceptions. The results are consistent with our third hypothesis (H3) 
indicating that there is a complementary association between risk disclosure and income 
smoothing.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In panel B of Table 2, we examine the correlation between the error terms of Equations (1) and 
(2). We use the Breusch–Pagan test of independence of residuals and find this to be significant. 
The correlation coefficient between the residuals of risk disclosure (RD_Res) and income 
smoothing (IS_Res) is significantly negative, at the 1% level (correlation coefficient = -0.096). 
This provides support for a substitutive association between risk disclosure and income smoothing. 
The residuals in Equation (1) reflect the unexplained portion of the variation in risk disclosure 
(RD_Res) which is likely being substituted with the unexplained portion of the variation in income 
smoothing (IS_Res), the residuals in Equation (2). Thus, the results provide evidence that firms in 
some cases trade-off between the levels of risk reporting and income smoothing. The substitution 
effect results from other incentives that are not explained by the firm risk profile and other firm 
characteristics included in the model. Perhaps, these incentives relate to managers’ compensation 
motives which are beyond the scope of this study.  
The results in column 3 use our alternative measure of income smoothing (IS_Corr) as dependent 
variable in Equation (2). The results are similar, suggesting that firms use risk disclosure and 
income smoothing as complements when leverage risk increases (β2 = 0.042, significant at the10% 
level in column 3). Also, the correlation between the error terms (RD_Res) and (IS_Corr_Res) in 
panel B of Table 2 is significantly negative at the 10% level (correlation coefficient = -0.061), 
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thus, confirming the tradeoff between risk disclosure and income smoothing, driven by other 
incentives not explained by our model.  
5.  Additional analyses and robustness tests  
In Table 3, we provide an alternative methodology to test the substitutive association between risk 
disclosure and income smoothing. The unexplained portion of the variation in income smoothing 
(IS_Res) could be endogenous to the levels of risk disclosure. Hence, we test this by including 
IS_Res as an explanatory variable in Equation (1). Specifically, we re-estimate Equation (1) for 
risk disclosure using a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression including an additional 
variable (IS_Res) as follows: 
RDit = β0 + β1IS_Resit + 2Betait + β3Leverageit + β4Solvencyit + β5Liquidityit + 
β6Op_Riskit + β7RARit + β8Sizeit + β9Growthit + β10Profitabilityit + β11Dividendit + 
β12Cross_Listingit + β13Ind_Directorsit + β14Analystsit + εit                                                           (3)   
 
The results in Table 3 show that the coefficient on IS_Res is significantly and negatively related 
to risk disclosure (β1= -0.035, significant at the 1% level), which is consistent with the findings in 
Panel B of Table 2, that risk disclosure is inversely correlated with income smoothing. That is, 
unknown managerial incentives may result in a trade-off between both reporting choices. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We extend the robustness tests by introducing the level of institutional ownership (the percentage 
of shares held by institutions)3 as an additional control variable in Equations (1) and (2). Prior 
literature documents that institutional shareholders act as powerful stakeholders with monitoring 
roles that influence risk reporting (Ntim et al., 2013) and earnings smoothing practices (Yu et al., 
2018). The results (untabulated) remain unchanged.   
Our final robustness test addresses different levels of risk in firms. We re-estimate Equations (1) 
and (2) after segregating between high-risk and low-risk firms to examine whether the 
complementary/substitutive relationship holds at different risk levels. We consider a firm with 
Beta more (less) than one as a high-risk (low-risk) firm (See Elshandidy et al., 2013). Table 4 
reports the results of the subsample analysis. Panel A shows that the results for high-risk firms are 
                                                            
3 We re-estimate the regression for the years 2010-2015, because historical data for institutional ownership is not 
available on Bloomberg before 2010.  
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similar to those reported in Table 2 for the entire sample with Leverage being the driver of the 
complementary association between risk disclosure and income smoothing (β2 = 0.060 and β2 = 
0.137, including RD and IS as dependent variables, respectively, both significant at the 1% level). 
As for low-risk firms, leverage risk is only positively correlated with risk disclosure (β2 = 0.071, 
significant at the 1% level). Therefore, we conclude that high-risk firms are more likely to report 
jointly risk information and smooth income as their leverage risk increases in order to lower firm 
perceived credit risk. Moreover, panel B presents qualitatively similar results for the correlation 
of residuals between IS_Res and RD_Res for high-risk firms, but significant results for low-risk 
firms (correlation coefficient = -0.106), thus supporting the evidence of risk reporting and income 
smoothing being reported as substitutes. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
6.  Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether risk disclosure and income smoothing are used as complements 
or substitutes in relation to various firm risk measures. We test the associations by estimating a 
seemingly unrelated regression model to determine the nature of the association between both 
reporting choices with respect to firm risk and other firm-specific characteristics. We find that as 
financial risk increases, firms have more incentives to report incremental levels of risk disclosure 
and smoother earnings. Firms are likely to use both reporting choices as complements for several 
reasons. First, to reduce perceived default risk including expected cost of debt. Second, to meet 
UK regulatory risk reporting requirements regarding financial risk and risk management controls. 
Third, to signal higher risk management abilities compared to other firms with lower levels of risk 
disclosure and volatile earnings. Moreover, we find that while the level of risk disclosure is 
negatively associated with liquidity risk, the extent of income smoothing is positively associated 
with operational risk. We also find that there is a substitutive relation between risk disclosure and 
income smoothing for other drivers unexplained by firm riskiness and firm-level characteristics.  
These findings are important to regulators, investors and boards of directors through highlighting 
the alternative reporting strategies that firms with high risk can choose between. The results 
indicate that regulators may need to consider further regulation on UK firms’ smoothing decisions 
and risk reporting.  The risk disclosures should be subject to external audits in order to ensure that 
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disclosed information is relevant to the underlying firm risk profile, specifically to systematic, 
liquidity, and operational risks. 
We do not consider other factors such as managerial optimism, managerial financial incentives 
and analysts’ earnings forecasts which might influence the association between risk disclosure and 
income smoothing and hence this may be a limitation of the current study. These drivers can be 
considered as potential avenues for future research in examining the substitutive relation between 
both reporting choices. Also, our measurement of risk disclosure does not consider the quality of 
the textual risk information disclosed in UK firms’ annual reports. Future research may develop a 
quantitative measure for the disclosure quality of risk reporting in the UK and hence investigate 
more than one dimension of textual risk disclosure in relation to firm risk and income smoothing. 
Also, further work may build on insights concerning the complementary relation between risk 
disclosure and income smoothing by examining the economic consequences of this relation on 
capital providers’ perceptions of firm risk and expected cost of capital. 
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Table 1 
Sample Statistics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics (814 firm-year observations 2005-2015) 
      
Variable     Mean 
Lower  
Quartile 
 
Median 
 Upper 
Quartile 
Standard 
Deviation 
RD 5.507 5.142 5.529 5.878 0.529 
IS  -1.265 -1.493 -0.987 -0.698 0.901 
Beta 1.017 0.610 0.890 1.320 0.571 
Leverage 0.970 0.331 0.588 1.119 1.278 
Solvency 0.734 0.252 0.486 0.891 1.039 
Liquidity 0.969 0.633 0.824 1.200 0.553 
Op_Risk 0.033 0.015 0.025 0.041 0.027 
RAR  0.411 0.000 0.366 0.802 0.532 
Size 9.057 8.028 8.894 10.046 1.353 
Growth  3.891 1.738 2.836 4.714 4.720 
Profitability  0.139 0.092 0.125 0.179 0.082 
Dividend 0.585 0.258 0.442 0.622 0.843 
Cross_Listing 0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.485 
Ind_Directors  0.621 0.538 0.625 0.700 0.124 
Analysts 2.998 2.773 3.045 3.258 0.379 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Pairwise Spearman (Pearson) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) RD  -0.163 0.147 0.076 0.050 -0.048 -0.017 0.008 0.436 0.021 -0.026 0.064 0.202 0.412 0.451 
(2) IS -0.187  -0.039 0.105 0.092 0.005 0.212 0.081 -0.157 0.156 0.012 0.149 -0.131 -0.151 -0.209 
(3) Beta 0.156 -0.055  0.016 -0.019 0.037 -0.078 0.015 0.107 0.067 -0.008 0.073 0.035 0.099 0.160 
(4) Leverage 0.063 0.059 0.032  0.677 0.294 -0.218 -0.024 0.072 0.352 -0.017 0.279 -0.039 -0.055 -0.129 
(5) Solvency 0.009 0.083 -0.026 0.214  0.335 -0.276 0.034 0.037 0.245 -0.023 0.288 -0.100 -0.019 -0.067 
(6) Liquidity -0.150 -0.023 0.011 0.115 0.182  -0.280 0.055 0.287 0.081 -0.013 0.254 0.157 0.009 0.153 
(7) Op_Risk -0.011 0.221 -0.020 -0.096 -0.127 -0.236  0.018 -0.241 0.199 0.326 -0.265 -0.084 -0.098 -0.064 
(8) RAR -0.008 0.160 0.038 -0.022 0.047 0.024 0.029  -0.078 0.488 0.303 0.163 -0.034 -0.001 -0.078 
(9) Size 0.448 -0.161 0.096 0.008 0.017 0.220 -0.198 -0.090  -0.242 -0.145 0.126 0.460 0.397 0.509 
(10) Growth -0.021 0.065 0.050 0.595 0.125 0.020 0.121 0.255 -0.180  0.516 0.147 -0.002 -0.077 -0.078 
(11) Profitability -0.055 0.181 0.024 0.040 -0.026 -0.049 0.275 0.314 -0.127 0.375  0.020 0.105 0.000 0.063 
(12) Dividend 0.034 0.031 0.012 0.087 0.031 0.051 -0.080 0.022 0.022 -0.019 -0.058  0.093 0.056 0.032 
(13) Cross_Listing 0.198 -0.106 0.046 0.022 -0.054 0.215 -0.111 -0.035 0.486 0.009 0.064 -0.016  0.361 0.334 
(14) Ind_Directors 0.414 -0.146 0.110 -0.084 -0.064 0.030 -0.097 0.008 0.435 -0.074 -0.001 0.023 0.362  0.386 
(15) Analysts 0.488 -0.165 0.175 -0.068 0.002 0.116 -0.104 -0.060 0.521 0.011 0.039 -0.040 0.308 0.375  
All variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
Bold numbers in Panel B indicate statistical significance at 10% or lower using a two-tailed test. 
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RD_Res is the residual value from Equation (1) which is the unexplained portion of risk disclosure; IS_Res 
(IS_Corr_Res) is the residual value from Equation (2) which is the unexplained portion of income smoothing; 
all remaining variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Association between Risk Disclosure, Income Smoothing and Firm Risk 
 
The table shows the coefficient estimates (z-statistics) from seemingly unrelated regressions based on 814 firm-
year observations of the form:  
RDit = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + β6RARit + β7Sizeit + β8Growthit + 
β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit                                             (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
ISit (IS_Corrit) = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + β6RARit + β7Sizeit + 
β8Growthit + β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit             (2)                    
 
 Panel A: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results     
RD IS  IS_Corr 
Beta  0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.018 
(-0.29) 
0.054 
(1.18) 
Leverage 0.063*** 
(6.10) 
0.076* 
(1.96) 
0.042* 
(1.80) 
Solvency 0.026*** 
(2.62) 
0.068** 
(2.53) 
0.036 
(1.43) 
Liquidity  -0.139*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.069 
(-1.10) 
0.010 
(0.18) 
Op_Risk 0.604 
(1.29) 
9.096*** 
(6.94) 
-0.881 
(-0.75) 
RAR -0.049* 
(-1.96) 
0.289*** 
(3.97) 
-0.096* 
(-1.76) 
Size 0.119*** 
(9.08) 
0.067* 
(1.92) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
Growth  -0.004 
(-0.92) 
-0.022* 
(-1.81) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
Profitability  0.004** 
(2.19) 
0.013** 
(2.38) 
0.008** 
(2.06) 
Dividend 0.010 
(0.62) 
0.018 
(0.49) 
-0.022 
(-0.59) 
Cross_Listing -0.035 
(-1.28) 
-0.020 
(-0.25) 
-0.031 
(-0.47) 
Ind_Directors  0.099 
(0.89) 
-0.065 
(-0.25) 
0.478** 
(1.97) 
Analysts 0.132*** 
(3.16) 
-0.371*** 
(-3.29) 
0.069 
(0.68) 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Chi-Square 
R2 
1806.37*** 
68.94% 
210.84*** 
20.57% 
73.84*** 
8.32% 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Residuals                          
 
 
                                              RD_Res    
RD_Res 
 
IS_Res                                   -0.096***                
 
 
IS_Corr_Res    -0.061*  
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Square    7.423***            3.034   
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Table 3 
Pooled Regressions 
 
The table shows the coefficient estimates (t-statistics) from Pooled OLS regressions based on 814 
firm-year observations of the form: 
RDit = β0 + β1IS_Resit + 2Betait + β3Leverageit + β4Solvencyit + β5Liquidityit + β6Op_Riskit + β7RARit + β8Sizeit + 
β9Growthit + β10Profitabilityit + β11Dividendit + β12Cross_Listingit + β13Ind_Directorsit + β14Analystsit + εit                  
(3)                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS_Res is the residual from Equation (2) which is the unexplained portion of income smoothing; all remaining 
variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
RD 
IS_Res 
-0.035*** 
(2.62) 
Beta  
0.001 
(0.04) 
Leverage 
0.063*** 
(6.20) 
Solvency 
0.026*** 
(2.64) 
Liquidity  
-0.139*** 
(5.73) 
Op_Risk 
0.604 
(1.27) 
RAR 
-0.049** 
(2.04) 
Size 
0.119*** 
(9.25) 
Growth  
-0.004 
(0.99) 
Profitability  
0.004** 
(2.08) 
Dividend 
0.01 
(0.65) 
Cross_Listing 
-0.035 
(-1.23) 
Ind_Directors  
0.099 
(0.92) 
Analysts 
0.132*** 
(3.1) 
Industry Controls  Yes 
Year Controls  Yes 
F-Statistic 66.62*** 
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Table 4 
Subsample Analysis for High-risk and Low-risk Firms 
 
The table shows the coefficient estimates (z-statistics) from seemingly unrelated regressions based on 357 high-risk 
and 457 low-risk firm-year observations of the form:  
RDit = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + β6RARit + β7Sizeit + β8Growthit + 
β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit                                                  (1)                                                                                                                                                                                                               
ISit = β0 + β1Betait + β2Leverageit + β3Solvencyit + β4Liquidityit + β5Op_Riskit + β6RARit + β7Sizeit + β8Growthit + 
β9Profitabilityit + β10Dividendit + β11Cross_Listingit + β12Ind_Directorsit + β13Analystsit + εit                                                  (2) 
Panel A: Seemingly unrelated regression results: 
 
High-risk Firms  
 
Low-risk Firms  
 
RD IS  
 
RD IS  
Beta  0.053 
(1.25) 
-0.069 
(-0.50) 
 0.172
*** 
(2.64) 
-0.446** 
(-2.38) 
Leverage 0.060*** 
(3.76) 
0.137*** 
(2.91) 
 0.071
*** 
(4.23) 
0.006 
(0.13) 
Solvency 0.037* 
(1.69) 
0.063 
(1.30) 
 0.017 
(1.59) 
0.071** 
(2.49) 
Liquidity  -0.138*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.088 
(-0.87) 
 -0.147
*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.077 
(-1.05) 
Op_Risk 0.332 
(0.45) 
9.559*** 
(4.15) 
 0.882 
(1.26) 
8.729*** 
(5.37) 
RAR -0.035 
(-0.80) 
0.393*** 
(2.97) 
 -0.043 
(-1.47) 
0.202** 
(2.05) 
Size 0.100*** 
(4.22) 
0.055 
(0.83) 
 0.133
*** 
(7.68) 
0.070 
(1.55) 
Growth  -0.010 
(-1.53) 
-0.051*** 
(-2.62) 
 -0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
Profitability  0.003 
(0.95) 
0.022** 
(2.52) 
 0.004 
(1.44) 
0.007 
(0.95) 
Dividend 0.013 
(0.49) 
0.078 
(1.18) 
 0.012 
(0.55) 
-0.014 
(-0.31) 
Cross_Listing -0.024 
(-0.47) 
0.021 
(0.17) 
 -0.040 
(-1.05) 
-0.081 
(-0.76) 
Ind_Directors  0.198 
(1.24) 
-0.308 
(-0.79) 
 
0.057 
(0.39) 
0.169 
(0.43) 
Analysts 0.048 
(0.69) 
-0.102 
(-0.56) 
 
0.194*** 
(3.33) 
-0.542*** 
(-3.62) 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Chi-Square 683.80*** 128.87***  1247.49***     134.92*** 
R2 65.70% 26.52%  73.19% 22.79% 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Residuals  
                                                                        RD_Res                                                                                                                                       
IS_Res     -0.048     -0.106  
Breusch-Pagan Chi-Square       0.808         5.162**  
RD_Res is the residual value from Equation (1) which is the unexplained portion of risk disclosure; IS_Res is the 
residual from Equation (2) which is the unexplained portion of income smoothing; all remaining variables are 
defined in Appendix 2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Appendix 1 
List of risk-related keywords used in study 
  
 
adverse* 
affect  
challeng* 
could  
detrimental  
expect 
expects 
expos* 
fail* 
fluctuat* 
impact*  
influenc* 
likely  
may  
might  
possibl* 
potential* 
risk* 
susceptible  
threat 
uncertain*  
unexpect*  
unhedge* 
unlikely 
unpredictable 
variability 
volatil* 
 
 
* includes derivations of the word 
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Appendix 2 
Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variable   Definition and Measurement  
Dependent Variables:  
RD  Risk disclosure; the natural logarithm of the total number of sentences 
containing at least one risk-related word 
IS Income smoothing; the ratio of a firm’s standard deviation of operating 
income deflated by total assets divided by the standard deviation of its 
cash flow from operations deflated by total assets, calculated over a  
period of 5-years. The measure is multiplied by -1, so that higher values 
indicate higher levels of income smoothing 
IS_Corr Alternative measure of income smoothing; the correlation between 
changes in accounting accruals and changes in cash flows from 
operations (both deflated by total assets), calculated over a period of 5-
years. The measure is multiplied by -1, so that higher values indicate 
higher levels of income smoothing 
Risk Measures:  
Beta Systematic risk; calculated based on the market model using firms’ 
monthly stock returns and the value weighted market index, over a 
period of 5-years  
Leverage Measure of firm financial risk; the ratio of total debt to total equity 
Solvency  Measure of firm financial risk, the reciprocal of asset coverage ratio; 
the difference between net assets and net liabilities divided by total 
liabilities 
Liquidity Liquidity risk, the reciprocal of current ratio; total current assets 
divided by total current liabilities 
Op_Risk Operational risk, the standard deviation of operating cash flows, 
estimated using annual data over a period of 5-years, deflated by total 
assets 
Control Variables:  
RAR  Sharpe ratio reflecting risk-adjusted returns;  the excess market returns 
divided by the standard deviation of monthly returns, over a period of 
5-years 
Size Size; the natural logarithm of total assets 
Growth Growth; the ratio of market value to book value of equity 
Profitability Profitability; the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortization divided by total assets 
Dividend  Dividend payout ratio; the proportion of net income distributed to 
shareholders in the form of dividends 
Cross_Listing  Dummy variable with a value of 1 for UK firms cross-listed on US 
stock exchange, and 0 otherwise 
Ind_Directors  Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Analysts Number of analysts following a firm 
 
 
